Title: The New Administration and Russia

The inauguration of a new U.S. president presents an inflection point, a moment of possibility just before a candidate’s election promises meet the realities of governing. As the United States enters the second Trump administration, SFS faculty offer their thoughts on how the 47th president’s statements during the campaign, policies during his first term and nominations and appointments announced thus far might impact different regions and issue areas around the world. The views expressed are the views of individual SFS faculty and not the views of SFS.

In conversation with SFS Professor Michael David-Fox, director of the Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies (CERES), we dive into key issues to watch for in the Trump administration’s possible policies and actions toward Russia, especially as related to the war in Ukraine.

What did Donald Trump, the candidate, promise regarding Russia?

Russia has elicited some of Trump’s most flamboyant claims before, during and after the campaign, in part because of the political fallout from the 2016 election interference charges that Trump called the “Russia hoax,” as well as his December 2019 impeachment over allegations he pressured Ukraine to come up with kompromat (as the Russians call it) on his political rival.

Immediately after Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, arguably the single most damaging act for the Russian Federation’s national interests since the country emerged in 1991, Trump termed it an act of “genius.” Early on in the campaign, in February 2024, he stated that he would encourage Russia to do “whatever the hell they want” to any NATO member country that did not meet spending guidelines on defense. During the campaign, he said repeatedly that he could end Russia’s war in Ukraine within 24 hours if he were elected—a timeline that was immediately rolled back once the election was over.

The incoming president is not known as a policy wonk. His immediate rollback of a number of campaign rally staples after the election indicate he did not, in fact, promise anything. That said, of all the strongmen around the world of whom Trump has spoken approvingly, Putin appears to occupy a special place, and his behavior over a long period of time seems to show a genuine undercurrent of admiration for Putin’s autocratic image.

But there are many divisions and disagreements among those who will surround Trump, and figures such as Marco Rubio and J.D. Vance have sounded rather different from him on Russia, Putin and Ukraine. Anyone looking at the situation must acknowledge a great deal of incoherence and uncertainty.

Campaign promises are hard to make good on, especially the broad, sweeping promises made during presidential campaigns. Based on President Trump’s policies during his first term, his appointment of Keith Kellogg as special envoy to Ukraine and Russia and his nomination of Michael Waltz as national security adviser, what do you expect the new administration to actually do?

First of all, I would not normalize the current moment by comparing it to the long history of promises and policy implications articulated in previous campaigns. The ethos and implications of candidate Trump’s rallies, as well as the documented echoes of Russian disinformation in high levels of the MAGA movement and Republican politics, should rather be seen as almost unprecedented. The U.S., its NATO allies and Ukraine all find themselves in rather uncharted territory. What, however, is crystal clear is that both Russia and Ukraine have been in something of a holding pattern for the past half-year, waiting for the results of the U.S. election, and that the election has triggered upcoming negotiations about the war. It is possible that Keith Kellogg and Michael Waltz will support one linchpin for any such negotiations—security guarantees for Ukraine—but that will likely not depend on them, or even on Trump, but on Vladimir Putin. One thing to watch for: will Trump’s attitude toward Putin sour if the Russian leader puts major obstacles in the way of a deal?

Based on your expertise and experience in this area, are you optimistic or pessimistic about the policy direction about Russia over the next four years? Why?

I think those analysts who are now in search of silver linings and unexpected policy opportunities are likely engaging in psychological self-delusion. Structurally, U.S.-Russia relations have been deteriorating for almost two decades now, and Russian politics and ideology are the most anti-Western they have been since the onset of the Cold War in the late Stalin period. This cannot be easily reversed, as Russia has reoriented its entire international stance, its economy, its domestic politics and even its culture as a result of the war against Ukraine, which it portrays as a U.S. war backed by subservient proxies in Ukraine and Europe. Russia has been committed to a radically revisionist stance toward the international system for some time. The U.S. election only accelerates the demise of the international order the world has known since the end of the Cold War. We are entering a much more unpredictable and, frankly, dangerous phase of great power politics.