On September 2, 2025, President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. military had carried out a strike against a fishing boat off the coast of Venezuela, killing all 11 people on board. The cause given was drug smuggling. There have been 20 strikes in the Caribbean Sea and Eastern Pacific Ocean and 80 people killed since September 2, including the most recent strike on November 12. This has been a change in policy for the U.S. approach to maritime drug smuggling off the coast of Latin America, which has historically been treated as a law enforcement issue handled by the U.S. Coast Guard. Many legal experts believe the strikes to be unlawful, extrajudicial killings. A classified memo from the U.S. Department of Justice is said to be the administration’s legal justification for the strikes and rests on President Trump’s determination that the U.S. is in a state of armed conflict with the drug cartels, and the fishermen are “combatants.”
The U.S. military has been building up forces near Venezuela, including this week, sending the USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier to the Caribbean. Media reports speculate that the Trump Administration’s ultimate goal is regime change in Venezuela, and President Trump has said he thinks that Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro’s days are numbered. But how these pieces fit together and what might come next is not clear. We spoke with Professor Michael Shifter, adjunct professor in the Center for Latin American Studies, about the Trump Administration’s strategy for Venezuela. Shifter is the former president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a leading policy forum for Western Hemisphere Affairs.
Q: The Trump Administration has maintained that the 20 U.S. military strikes against fishing boats in the Caribbean Sea and Eastern Pacific Ocean since September 2 are a response to drug smuggling. How does this differ from the approach that the U.S. has historically taken to maritime drug smuggling off the coast of Latin America?
A: The Trump Administration’s policy of destroying fishing boats allegedly carrying drugs and killing people without due process or providing any evidence constitutes a radical departure from the U.S.’s traditional approach in combating the maritime drug trade in Latin America. In all significant respects, what is happening today is unprecedented. The decades-long policy adopted by all previous U.S. administrations chiefly relied on the U.S. Coast Guard and the Drug Enforcement Administration to patrol coastlines, target smuggling routes and seize shipments. Alleged criminals were detained and tried in a court of law. Forging partnerships with other countries was emphasized. To be sure, as the Trump Administration contends, the traditional approach often proved inadequate and fell short of expected results. Yet, it is hard to see how the current policy will be able to make a dent in the far more sophisticated, increasingly global and dramatically transformed trade in illegal narcotics. A new, more intelligent and sophisticated approach is needed, including a serious focus on curbing demand at home.
Q: What is the Trump Administration’s strategy towards Venezuela? How do these attacks on fishing boats support that overall strategy?
A: It is hard to know precisely what the Trump Administration’s strategy towards Venezuela is, or even if there is a strategy, beyond displaying toughness and projecting power and dominance aimed at what it now labels as a “narco-terrorist” regime led by Nicolas Maduro. Even though Venezuela serves as a transit point for cocaine produced in neighboring Colombia that is shipped mostly to Europe, not the U.S., the Administration has largely framed the relentless military pressure in terms of fighting drugs. Its stance on whether it is seeking regime change, which seems to be the real objective, has been ambiguous. It is plausible that the impressive U.S. military deployment in the Caribbean and attacks on the fishing boats are part of an intimidation campaign to provoke panic and fear within the regime that will produce cracks in the armed forces and eventually result in ousting Maduro. Since the days of Maduro’s predecessor, Hugo Chavez, the U.S. has been betting that senior military officers would defect and create the conditions leading to a democratic transition. Maduro’s days may indeed be numbered, as President Trump recently said, but he has proven to be a survivor.
Q: How are the Trump Administration’s actions being perceived in Venezuela? What do you expect from President Maduro in response?
A: Although President Maduro retains a core base of political support, he is overwhelmingly unpopular in Venezuela. Few doubt that in the July 2024 national elections, Maduro lost decisively to Edmundo Gonzalez, who stood in for the opposition’s most popular leader and the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize winner Maria Corina Machado, who the regime prohibited from running. Machado, in hiding in Venezuela, has publicly supported the Trump administration’s aggressive, militarized policy off the country’s coast. Other opposition figures have been more critical of what they deem the U.S.’s illegal actions. Although most Venezuelans want Maduro out of office, they are worried about what might come next and the risks of a breakdown in internal security. Criminal groups and illicit activities are rampant in Venezuela, so even without Maduro in charge, moving towards a peaceful situation will be exceedingly difficult. To date, in response to sustained U.S. pressure and threats, Maduro has been defiant. Unsurprisingly, and invoking a national emergency, the regime has further cracked down on any potential dissent and opposition. Maduro has announced “maximum preparedness” in defense, has put his country in full mobilization mode, and has reportedly called up millions of militias to help deter U.S. intervention. He has asked such allies as Russia, China and Iran for support in countering U.S. aggression but should probably not expect much from any of them.
Q: Media reports have suggested that the Trump Administration’s ultimate goal is regime change in Venezuela. Do you give credence to this hypothesis? How likely is that objective to be met?
A: The idea that the Trump Administration’s ultimate goal in Venezuela is regime change has gained credence in the past few weeks. Given the magnitude of the U.S. military build-up and show of force, the claim that the objective is fighting drugs is not credible. The Administration’s hope appears to be that Maduro will be so rattled by the military deployment that he will see the writing on the wall and decide to self-deport to a friendly country. So far, there are no signs he is ready to pursue that option. The other possibility is that Maduro will be ousted from inside the military ranks, and someone will claim the $50 million bounty on his head. It is hard to know how probable that is. Some experts talk about a surgical strike against Maduro along the lines of the drone strike Trump ordered against General Soleimani in his first term. Even if any of these options were to materialize, the question remains: what happens next? If Maduro is removed but a military officer or someone else within the regime takes over, will that be acceptable? If not, how would the U.S. help engineer a democratic change? Since committing U.S. troops on Venezuelan soil appears to be out of the question, given the enormous risks involved, how realistic is it to believe that a transition can be achieved in the short term in a country dominated by Chavista rule for over a quarter century? Key questions abound.