The global order is breaking down, driven by shifting centers of power, technological disruption and growing rivalry among nations. In a new Foreign Policy article, SFS Professor Charles Kupchan lays out a vision for what a new global governing structure could look like: a network of high-level coordinating councils called a concert system, which is inspired by the 19th century’s Concert of Europe. This draws from his forthcoming book Bringing Order to Anarchy: Governing the World to Come, which will be published by Yale University Press in October 2026.
We spoke to Kupchan about what comes next, the future of U.S. foreign policy and how AI and domestic economic change are reshaping the world.
Q. You describe the current moment as a “Gramscian interregnum,” where the post-Cold War order is dying, but a new one has yet to emerge. What do you see as the primary forces driving this transition, and what makes this period of change unique?
A. The world is passing through an interregnum between an old order that is breaking down and a new one that has not yet been imagined. This historical inflection point is the product of two tectonic shifts. Power in the international system is diffusing from West to East and North to South, leading to a decentered world. At the same time, the advance of the digital age is undermining the social contract of the industrial era, producing widespread socioeconomic dislocation and making states, democracies in particular, more difficult to govern. These dual transitions are stoking geopolitical rivalries and eroding international rules and institutions, bringing down the old order and producing global disarray.
We have been here before. The current moment closely resembles the end of the 19th century, when Pax Britannica gave way to a world of multiple power centers just as the industrial era was coming into full swing and bringing the agricultural era to an end. Calamity resulted from the combination of rapid shifts in the international distribution of power and profound socioeconomic changes within states: two world wars claimed 100 million lives. That sobering history provides ample warning of the need for careful management of the current interregnum and of efforts to forge the next international order—before, not after, another great power war.
Q. Recent arguments suggest the United States should move away from universalizing the liberal order toward building a more pluralistic, ideologically diverse system. What would that framework look like in practice, and what role should the U.S. play in shaping it?
A. Constructive diplomacy and public debate about what a new order might look like are hard to come by; dialogue is afflicted by growing rivalry among nations and political division within them. Proposals of various sorts, however, are beginning to emerge within academic circles.
My own view is that we are headed toward a more regionalized world. The diffusion of power across the international system logically necessitates the devolution of authority and responsibility to regions. Each region will play by its own rules and norms, producing a multi-order world of considerable ideological and political diversity. Order will come from the bottom up. At the same time, precisely because we live in a globalized and interdependent world, order will need to come from the top down. The United Nations system is meant to fulfill this function. But it is too big, too bulky and too often paralyzed by the veto-wielding powers that sit on the Security Council. To fulfill this centralizing function, I propose a system of concerts—informal steering groups of key players that would provide top-down oversight of global governance.
The United States has a leading role to play in shaping the next order. Washington will need to work with democracies and autocracies alike to build an order fit for purpose in the 21st century.
Q. There is an increasing connection between international transformations and domestic pressures like automation, globalization, inequality and middle-class decline. How should the relationship between domestic economic health and U.S. foreign policy be understood?
A. Unpacking the nature of our moment entails appreciating the degree to which technological change is having a huge impact on socioeconomic and political conditions. Automation is pushing workers from the manufacturing sector to the service sector, in many cases at lower pay. The advance of AI is poised to hit service sector jobs as well. The embrace of free trade that emerged in the 1990s made matters worse by offshoring millions of manufacturing jobs. In the meantime, social media is amplifying the grievances emerging from economic dislocation, polarizing the United States on matters of both domestic and foreign policy. Many other countries are experiencing a similar hollowing out of the political center.
Beginning in World War II and continuing through the Cold War and into the 21st century, U.S. foreign policy was anchored by a centrist, bipartisan compact. That bipartisan compact has collapsed, producing wide swings in U.S. foreign policy as power changes hands in Washington. Steadying U.S. statecraft will require rebuilding the nation’s political center.
Q. At a moment of significant uncertainty about the future of the international order, how are you teaching students to think about U.S. foreign policy and America’s role in the world?
A. First, I emphasize the importance of historical knowledge. At moments of uncertainty and change such as ours, history is the best guide. Second, I emphasize the interconnections between domestic and international politics. These used to be somewhat separate realms of study, but the lines have blurred. Third, and this is the biggest challenge, technological change needs to be brought fully into the picture. On this front, intellectual barriers are hard to bring down. Many professors, myself included, have ample knowledge about diplomatic and geopolitical matters, but scant exposure to AI, its likely trajectory and its political and geopolitical impact. Conversely, professors with technological expertise tend to have less exposure to the matters of geopolitics. We need to work to bring down these disciplinary barriers.